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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1, Have the petitioners shown "special and important reasons" justifying review by 
writ of certiorari where their only argument is that the lower courts erred in deciding that there 
was insufficient evidence of Cal Gas's negligence to withstand a motion for summary judgment? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply Utah law regarding summary judgment, 
negligence and res ipsa loquitur in affirming the trial court's decision? 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEAU 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, which is published in 821 P.2d 458, is 
included in the appendix. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals entered its decision in this matter on November 20, 1991. On 
December 19, 1991, die plaintiffs and appellants sought an extension of time until January 20, 
1992, to petition for certiorari. They filed their petition for writ of certiorari on January 21, 
1992 (January 20 being a legal holiday). This court has jurisdiction to grant or deny the petition 
for writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2), (3)(a) and (5). 
CONTROLLING RULES OF LAW 
This case does not involve controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, 
or regulations. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts 
The plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips, brought this action against Cal Gas 
Company and C.R. England & Sons, Inc., seeking damages for personal injuries they suffered 
when the tractor-trailer they occupied overturned on Interstate 80 near Wendover, Utah. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were negligent and that their negligence proximately caused 
the plaintiffs5 injuries. See Record ("R.") at 2-7. Cal Gas moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that any negligence on its part was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs* injuries. R. 
at 87-98. That motion was denied. R. at 114, 136-37. Cal Gas then moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that there was no evidence that Cal Gas was negligent. R. at 179-84. 
That motion was granted, R. at 308-12, and the plaintiffs appealed, R. at 315-16. (The plaintiffs 
have settled with C.R. England.) 
The appeal was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals. A panel of the Court of 
Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's grant of Cal Gas's motion for summary 
judgment in all respects. See Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. In February 1986, the plaintiffs, Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips, were truck 
drivers for what is now A.N.R. Freight Systems, Inc. R. at 3 17; Deposition of Joseph Richard 
Kitchen ("Kitchen Depo.*) (R. at 327) at 12. 
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2. On February 5, 1986, Kitchen and Phillips drove an A.N.R. truck consisting of 
a tractor and two trailers out of Los Angeles, California, heading for Salt Lake City. Kitchen 
Depo. at 35-36. 
3. At about 11:30 p.m. on February 5, 1986, the plaintiffs pulled into the weigh 
station at the port of entry near Wendover, Utah. Kitchen Depo. at 43, 97-98. A highway 
patrol officer at the weigh station told Kitchen that there were patches of black ice beginning 
about twelve to fourteen miles ahead and continuing on into Salt Lake City. Id. at 44 & 114. 
4. When the plaintiffs left the weigh station, Kitchen was driving, and Phillips was 
in the truck's sleeping compartment. Deposition of Richard Allen Phillips ("Phillips Depo.") 
(R. at 328) at 10-11. 
5. Shortly after the A.N.R. truck left the weigh station, it was passed by a Cal Gas 
truck that appeared to be "in a hurry." Kitchen Depo. at 48-49, 74 & 113. 
6. Where the Cal Gas truck passed the A.N.R. truck, the road was wet but not icy. 
Id. at 46, 48. -Citchen first encountered black ice fourteen or fifteen miles east of the point at 
which the Cal Gas truck passed him. Id. at 46, 48-49. 
7. About twenty-five minutes after the plaintiffs left the weigh station, a Toyota pick-
up truck passed them. The Tsyota had been traveling in the left-hand lane, and the A.N.R. 
truck was in the right-hand feLfe of the two eastbound lanes of traffic. Id. at 50, 73. As the 
Toyota passed the A.N.R. truck, it turned on its high beams, and Kitchen saw "a shadow*1 in the 
road ahead, "like a* glare . . . from the lights hitting on the object." Id. at 50, 79. The object 
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was at least one-quarter mile away. Id. at 53. Kitchen could not tell if the object was stopped 
or moving. Id. at 123. 
8. As the Toyota truck passed the A.N.R. truck, Kitchen slacked off the throttle to 
slow down and let the Toyota truck into his lane. Id. at 51 & 79. 
9. As the A.N.R. truck slowed down, a C.R. England truck hit it from behind, 
causing Kitchen to lose control of the A.N.R. truck. The A.N.R. truck overturned on its side, 
injuring Kitchen and Phillips. Id. at 52, 79-80, 96-97; R. at 4 1 11. 
10. After the plaintiffs were pulled out of their vehicle, they saw the Cal Gas truck 
overturned ahead of them, blocking the left-hand lane and part of the right-hand lane. Kitchen 
Depo. at 49, 51; Phillips Depo. at 12, 14. The A.N.R. truck never struck the Cal Gas truck. 
In fact, the Cal Gas truck was some distance away.1 
11. There was no evidence as to how the Cal Gas truck overturned. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs have not offered any "special and important reasons" why this court should 
grant review by writ of certiorari. Their only argument is that there were sufficient facts of 
* Kitchen estimated the distance to be less than 65 feet. Kitchen Depo. at 93. With 
no citation to the record, the plaintiffs now put the distance at 200 feet. See Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari ("Petition") at 2. Newell Knight, the only expert witness in the case, put the 
distance at over a quarter of a mile. Deposition of Newell Knight (R. at 329) at 106. In fact, 
Mr. Knight, who was hired by C.R. England, concluded that the distance between the Cal Gas 
truck and the A.N.R. truck was so great that there was no relationship between the Cal Gas 
accident and the A.N.R. accident. LJ. at 100-02. 
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record from which a jury could have concluded that Cal Gas was negligent. Two courts have 
now considered and rejected this argument. The courts' conclusions are supported by established 
Utah law governing the standard for summary judgment, negligence and res ipsa loquitur. The 
plaintiffs5 petition for writ of certiorari should therefore be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED ANY "SPECIAL AND 
IMPORTANT REASONS" WHY THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW. 
Review by writ of certiorari is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion. Utah R. 
App. P. 46; Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5). A party seeking review by writ of certiorari has the 
burden of demonstrating "special and important reasons" why the writ should be granted. Utah 
R. App. P. 46. The type of cases in which such review is justified include cases in which one 
panel of the Court of Appeals renders a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel or 
in conflict with a decision of this Court; cases in which the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important unsettled question of law that should be settled by this Court; and cases in which the 
decision of the Court of Appeals "has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Id. None of these situations applies in 
this case. 
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The plaintiffs have not alleged, much less demonstrated, any "special" or "important11 
reasons for granting their petition.2 They do not even cite Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
46, which sets forth the considerations governing review by certiorari. Rather, they concede that 
this case is governed by general principles of tort law. Petition at 2. Their only argument is 
that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing their negbgence claim against 
Cal Gas to go to a jury. As shown below, the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly applied 
controlling Utah law in granting Cal Gas's motion for summary judgment and in affirming that 
judgment. 
II. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CAL GAS'S NEGLIGENCE 
TO WITHSTAND A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The plaintiffs claim that the standard for granting summary judgment, especially in 
negligence cases, is "very restrictive." Petition at 7. In fact, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) 
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 
* Their Petition for Writ of Certiorari is simply a warmed-over version of their brief 
on appeal. They have simply cut out portions to meet the shorter page limitation for petitions 
for certiorari and changed the word "plaintiffs" to "petitioners." The Petition does not present 
any argument or authority that the Court of Appeals has not already fully considered. 
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).3 Utah appellate courts have not hesitated 
to affirm summary judgments where the record is devoid of any evidence (or at least any 
evidence that is not highly speculative) to establish an essential element of a negligence claim.4 
Sfi£, &&, Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 415-16 (Utah 1990) (insufficient evidence of 
negligence); Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 1985) (no proof that 
the defendants' alleged negligence was the proximate cause of injury); Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 
1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983) (no evidence of a dangerous condition that caused the accident); 
Massey v. Utah Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 938-39 (Utah 1980) (insufficient evidence of 
negligence); Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah 1973) (no evidence 
of negligence); Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (1968) (no showing 
of negligence); Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc.. 775 P.2d 445,446-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
* Although Celotex was decided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is identical to the federal rule in all relevant respects. To the 
extent that Utah rules are substantially similar to their federal counterparts, this Court has looked 
to federal courts' interpretation of the federal rules in construing the Utah rules. See, e.g.T 
Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1984). 
4
 The essential elements of a negligence claim are (1) a duty that the defendant owed 
the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty (that is, negligence), (3) proximate cause, and (4) injury 
in fact. Sfifi, jLg,, Williams y, Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App, 1991). The plaintiffs claim that each 
of these elements presents a question for the jury. Petition at 10. In fact, the question of duty 
is a question of law for the court. Sfig, fi^, Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); 
Weber v. Springville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). The other elements, like any 
other fact question, present a question for the jury only if reasonable minds could reach different 
conclusions from the evidence. Sfifi, &&., Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983). 
€X Gray v. Scott. 565 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 328B & 
328C (1963 & 1964). 
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(no evidence of negligence); Robinson V, IntermQTOtaifl Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262,264-67 
(Utah Q. App. 1987) (insufficient evidence of negligence). This is true even where, as here, 
the plaintiff also relied on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. Sfi£, e.g.. Hunt, 785 P.2d at 415-16; 
RQhiflm 740 P.2d at 264-67. 
The plaintiffs next argue that there were genuine issues of material fact on the issue of 
Cal Gas's negligence, precluding summary judgment. However, bare allegations of negligence, 
"unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of feet 
as will preclude the entry of summary judgment." Massey, 609 P.2d at 938. The plaintiffs have 
not specified any material fact that they claim was in dispute.5 They simply claim that, because 
the trial court denied Cal Gas's motion for summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause 
and because the issues of proximate cause and negligence are "intertwined," it was "illogical" 
not to find a disputed issue of feet regarding negligence. Petition at 8. In fact, the dispositive 
issue on Cal Gas's first motion was whether the negligence of the C.R. England truck was a 
superseding cause of the accident. The trial court simply concluded that it could not say, as a 
matter of law, whether C.R. England's negligence was foreseeable and hence a superseding cause 
of the accident. £f. Harris V, Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219-20 (Utah 1983) (trial 
court erred in not submitting the issue of proximate cause to the jury where reasonable minds 
could have inferred from the evidence that a subsequent actor's negligence was foreseeable). It 
5
 Cal Gas concedes that there were genuine issues of fact, see SU£Q note 1, but none 
of those facts was material to the issue of whether Cal Gas was negligent. 
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does not follow that, if C.R. England was negligent, then Cal Gas must have been negligent, 
too. It is not "illogical" to say that, on the one hand, the foreseeability of C.R. England's 
negligence presented a jury question while, on the other hand, there was no evidence of Cal 
Gas's negligence. £f. Reeves v, Oeigy Pharmaceutical, toe, 764 P.2d 636,642 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (dispute in the evidence as to causation was no bar to entry of summary judgment based 
on undisputed evidence of no negligence). Therefore, the court's decision on Cal Gas's first 
motion for summary judgment cannot create a factual dispute as to the Cal Gas driver's 
negligence, nor can it satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of establishing Cal Gas's negligence. 
Thus, the only issue the lower courts had to decide was whether the plaintiffs had made 
a sufficient showing of Cal Gas's negligence to get to a jury. They correctly concluded that the 
plaintiffs had not. 
Both in the trial court and on appeal, the only relevant evidence that the plaintiffs relied 
on to establish Cal Gas's negligence was the fact that the Cal Gas truck was overturned in the 
road and that the road was slippery in places.6 See Petition at 10. That is simply not enough 
* In the lower courts the plaintiffs also suggested that the fact that the Cal Gas truck 
appeared to be "in a hurry" when it passed the A.N.R. truck coming out of the weigh station 
some 17-18 miles and 25-45 minutes before the accident, where the roads were not slippery, 
supported an inference of negligence. There was no evidence as to how fast the Cal Gas truck 
was going at the time (that is, that it was going too fast for existing conditions), and the evidence 
was too remote to be admissible. See generally Annotation, Admissibility, in Action Involving 
Motor Vehicle Accident, of Evidence as to Manner in Which Participant Was Driving Before 
Reaching Scene of Accident. 46 A.L.R.2d 9 (1956), and cases cited therein. The trial court so 
ruled on Cal Gas's motion in limine. See R. at 253, 308 & 312. Thus, the evidence was 
insufficient to present a jury question because the jury never would have heard it. The plaintiffs 
did not appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine. Nevertheless, the Court of 
- 9 -
to withstand a motion for summary judgment. 
The fact that there were patches of black ice on Interstate 80 from about mile post 15 on 
into Salt Lake City says nothing about the Cal Gas driver's conduct at the time of the accident. 
There is no evidence that the Cal Gas truck overturned because of the black ice, and even if 
there were, that does not mean that the Cal Gas driver was negligent. Even the most careful 
drivers travelling at the safest speeds can lose control of a vehicle on black ice. See 821 P.2d 
at 464 ("Common experience and reason suggest black ice is a hazard that threatens even die 
most reasonable and prudent driver"). 
Similarly, the fact that the Cal Gas truck overturned says nothing about the Cal Gas 
driver's conduct. Utah courts have long held that the mere occurrence of an accident, without 
more, does not support an inference that anyone was negligent. See, fe^, McCloud v. Baum. 
569 P.2d 1125, 1127-28 (Utah 1977); Horsley v. Robinson. 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596 
(1947). There was a presumption, based on the instinct for self-preservation, that the Cal Gas 
driver was exercising due care for his own safety at the time his truck overturned. DeMille v. 
Erickson. 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d 159, 161 (1969), ceiL denied, 397 U.S. 1079 (1970). The 
presumption disappears only when the opposing party produces some evidence of negligence. 
Where, as here, the plaintiffs have produced no evidence as to the Cal Gas driver's conduct, the 
Appeals considered die evidence and concluded that the Cal Gas driver's being "in a hurry" so 
long before the accident "cannot sustain an inference that the Cal Gas driver was speeding and 
that such speeding continued after the roads became icy." 821 P.2d at 462. In any event, 
judging from their petition, it appears that the plaintiffs have now abandoned the argument. 
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presumption is not overcome, and it would be error to submit the issue of negligence to a jury. 
462 P.2d at 161-62. 
None of the cases the plaintiffs have cited is to the contrary. In each case where the issue 
of the defendant's negligence was submitted to the jury, there was evidence of the defendant's 
conduct at or shortly before the time of the accident, from which a jury could infer that the 
defendant was negligent. See, e ^ , Hall v. Blackham. 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664, 665 
(1966) (some evidence that the defendant handed a sandwich to the driver "immediately prior to 
the accident," thereby distracting him); Horsley. 186 P.2d at 594 (evidence that the vehicle was 
traveling at a "considerable speed" at the time of the accident and that the driver had sufficient 
time to avoid the collision if he had been in control of the vehicle); Kellv v. Montova. 81 N.M. 
591,470 P.2d 563, 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970) (disputed evidence that the defendant had parked 
his car on the highway in violation of a safety statute before the accident occurred).7 
Here the plaintiffs offered no evidence to establish that the Cal Gas driver was negligent. 
As the Court of Appeals concluded, "There are numerous possible explanations as to why the 
truck overturned, many of which would not involve the negligence of the driver and, in this case, 
all of which require speculation. Submitting die issue of negligence to the jury would require 
the jury to engage in mere speculation as to whether the Cal Gas driver was negligent. . . . 
7
 Although they have cited two Utah statutes, the plaintiffs never established in the 
lower courts the evidentiary foundation necessary to establish a violation of either statute. Thus, 
the statute, without more, cannot meet the plaintiffs* burden of establishing negligent conduct 
on the part of Cal Gas. SSS King v. Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987). 
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[BJecause Kitchen and Phillips have not produced any evidentiary basis for a jury to find the Cal 
Gas driver acted negligently, the trial court's summary judgment for Cal Gas on the issue of 
negligence was proper/ 821 P.2d at 462-63. 
HI. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT APPLY UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the lower courts erred in not allowing their negligence 
claim to get to a jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under that doctrine, a jury may 
infer negligence under certain circumstances notwithstanding a lack of evidence to show that the 
other party acted negligently. However, before a party can proceed on a theory of res ipsa 
loquitur, nthe party must satisfy a preliminary evidentiary foundation demonstrating that the facts 
of the case properly present a res ipsa loquitur question/ 821 P.2d at 463 (citing Nixdorf v. 
Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980)). Before the plaintiffs could rely on res ipsa loquitur, 
they had to prove 
(1) that the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would 
not have happened had due care been observed; (2) that the plaintiffs own use or 
operation of the agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the 
injury; and (3) that the agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under the 
exclusive management or control of the defendant. 
Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980) (footootes omitted). The Court of 
Appeals correctly found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the first element of res ipsa 
loquitur. It therefore did not have to consider the other elements. See 821 P.2d at 464. 
- 1 2 -
To establish the first element of res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must present evidence that 
the occurrence of the incident is "more probably than not caused by negligence." Ballow v. 
Monroe. 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1985) (quoting Quintal V. Lawel Grpyg Hospital 62 Cal. 2d 
154, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 397 P.2d 161, 171 (1964) (Traynor, C.J., concurring and dissenting)). 
The plaintiff must show that "the balance of probabilities" weighs in favor of negligence. Id. 
The mere fact that a driver loses control of his vehicle, even on an icy road, is not 
sufficient to meet the first element of res ipsa loquitur. See, &&., Millonig v. Bakken. 112 Wis. 
2d 445, 334 N.W.2d 80, 86 (1983); Wilson v. Rushton. 199 Kan. 659, 433 P.2d 444, 449 
(1967); and authorities cited therein. As these authorities recognize, a vehicle can slide on an 
icy road without fault on the part of the driver. Similarly, a truck can overturn for any number 
of reasons, only a few of which involve the negligence of the driver. For example, the driver 
could have had a sudden heart attack or stroke without any prior warning, or a deer or other 
animal could have darted into his path, or he could have been confronted with some other sudden 
emergency or mechanical failure, or a tire could have blown out, or he could have been 
sideswiped or rear-ended by another vehicle, or his truck could have been overturned by some 
natural force such as a sudden, strong gust of wind. The plaintiffs made no effort in the lower 
courts to rule out any of these non-negligent explanations of the truck overturning, nor did they 
introduce any evidence to show that, when a truck overturns, it is more likely than not because 
the driver was negligent. In fact, based solely on the evidence in this case, one would have to 
conclude that it is more likely than not that an overturned vehicle is not the result of the driver's 
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negligence. There was deposition testimony of three trucks overturning at one time or 
another—the Cal Gas truck and the plaintiffs' truck in this case, and another A.N.R. truck that 
plaintiff Kitchen had driven on another occasion. The plaintiffs do not claim that their truck 
overturned because of their own negligence, and, according to Mr. Kitchen, the other accident 
he was involved in was not the result of his negligence either. His trailer hitch broke, causing 
his trailer to overturn. £ge Kitchen Depo. at 25-26. Thus, based solely on the record in this 
case, one would have to conclude that more often that not trucks do not overturn as a result of 
their drivers' negligence. Because the plaintiffs failed to establish the first element of res ipsa 
loquitur, they could not rely on that doctrine to meet their burden of showing negligence. See, 
e.g.. Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990); Ballow. 699 P.2d at 723; Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Carer Inc.. 740 P.2d 262, 265-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have not presented any "special and important reasons" why this court 
should review the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' 
decision correctly applied Utah law in concluding that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient 
evidence of negligence to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, this Court 
should deny the plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
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been charged at all, nor do they raise an 
issue concerning a prosecutor's discretion 
to charge a lesser crime as part of a plea 
bargain. They argue only that they have 
received prison sentences while others have 
not and have therefore received unequal 
protection of the laws. 
In an effort to prove that other offenders 
did not receive the same sentence as they, 
plaintiffs offered as evidence clippings of 
several newspaper articles and letters sent 
to newspaper editors and an uncertified 
copy of a judgment from a different dis-
trict court in another case. Though these 
items are all hearsay, the trial court did not 
disallow this evidence. Instead, the court 
ruled that all of the evidence was irrele-
vant, even if any of it showed that others 
who were not entitled to the incest excep-
tion escaped incarceration, which it does 
not The judge stated that the fact that 
others may have received a sentence which 
violated the statute did not justify sentenc-
ing plaintiffs in a similarly illegal manner. 
The court ruled that inasmuch as plaintiffs 
received the sentences required under the 
law, their rights to equal protection were 
not violated. The petition was dismissed, 
and plaintiffs have appealed. We find no 
error. 
In essence, plaintiffs allege selective en-
forcement of the child sexual abuse laws. 
However, even proof that they were tried, 
convicted, and sentenced while others who 
were convicted of the same crime went 
unpunished does not show a violation of 
plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of the 
law. At best, the argument would show 
only laxity in enforcement of the law. But 
laxity in enforcement of the law with re-
spect to others is not a defense to enforce-
ment of the law against plaintiffs.2 Plain-
tiffs have failed even to allege that there is 
an intentional and deliberate plan on the 
part of state officials to enforce the law 
selectively against them. Their argument 
therefore fails. 
2. See State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 404-05 (Utah 
1989); Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15 
Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391, 395 (1964). Our 
sister states are in accord. See People v. Thorpe, 
641 P.2d 935 (Colo.1982); State v. Bowman, 104 
Idaho 39, 655 P.2d 933 (1982); Pork Motel, Corp. 
We have -carefully reviewed and con-
sidered the other points raised by plaintiffs 
on appeal and find them also to be without 
merit 
Affirmed. 
Joseph KITCHEN and Richard Phillips, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
CAL GAS COMPANY, INC., a California 
Corporation, Defendant and 
Appellee. 
No. 910420-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 20, 1991. 
Truck drivers injured in accident 
brought suit against owner of truck which 
overturned ahead of them, precipitating the 
accident. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Frank G. Noel, J., rendered 
summary judgment in favor of defendant, 
and plaintiff drivers appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ., held 
that: (1) there was no evidence of negli-
gence to rebut presumption that defen-
dant's driver was exercising due care, and 
(2) accident was not the type which normal-
ly did not occur in absence of negligence, 
as required for application of doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. 
Affirmed. 
v. Kansas Dep't of Health & Environment, 234 
Kan. 374, 673 P.2d 1126 (1983); In re Initiative 
Petition No. 272, State Question No. 409, 388 
P.2d 290 (Okla.1963); Somer v. Woodhouse, 28 
Wash.App. 262, 623 P.2d 1164 (1981). 
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1. Negligence =^»1 have happened had driver used due care, as 
In negligence action, plaintiff has bur- required to raise inference of negligence 
den of establishing duty, breach of duty, under doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
proximate cause and injury. 
2. Negligence <S=>136(14) 
Issue of negligence, or breach of legal 
duty, is normally question of fact for jury. 
3. Judgment <S=>185.3(21) 
Party may not merely rely on bald 
assertions of negligence to overcome mo-
tion for summary judgment; to have negli-
gence case submitted to jury, plaintiff must 
submit sufficient evidence to establish pri-
ma facie case against defendant 
4. Automobiles <3=242(1) 
Where driver is unavailable to testify 
as to his or her actions and there is no 
other evidence of driver's actions, driver is 
presumed to have been exercising due care. 
5. Automobiles <s=*242(2, 4) 
Mere fact that defendant's driver had 
passed plaintiffs "in a hurry" some 45 min-
utes before the accident could not support 
inference that driver was speeding and that 
such speeding continued after roads be-
came icy, and mere fact that defendant's 
truck was overturned in the road did not 
establish that driver acted negligently. 
6. Negligence <s=>121.2(3) 
To proceed on theory of res ipsa loqui-
tur, party must establish that accident was 
of kind which in ordinary course of events 
would not have happened had defendants 
used due care, instrument or thing causing 
injury was at the time of the accident un-
der management and control of defendant, 
and accident happened irrespective of any 
participation at the time by plaintiff. 
7. Negligence <s=>121.2(9) 
Once party satisfies preliminary evi-
dentiary foundation for res ipsa loquitur, 
there arises rebuttable inference of negli-
gence which will carry the party's case 
past motion for nonsuit. 
8. Automobiles e=»242(2) 
Mere fact that defendant's driver lost 
control of truck on icy road was insuffi-
cient to establish accident of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not 
James R. Black and Susan B. Black (ar-
gued), Wayne L. Black & Associates, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Fred R. Silves-
ter, Charles P. Sampson and Paul M. Sim-
mons (argued), Suitter, Axland, Armstrong 
& Hanson, Salt Lake City, for Cal Gas. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GARFF, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiffs Joseph Kitchen and Richard 
Phillips appeal from a summary judgment 
in favor of defendant Cal Gas Company, 
Inc., in a negligence action stemming from 
a truck accident. Kitchen and Phillips as-
sert there are disputed issues of material 
fact and, thus, the trial court erred in 
granting Cal Gas's motion for summary 
judgment. We affirm 
FACTS 
Kitchen and Phillips drove trucks for 
A.N.R. Freight Systems, Inc. (ANR). 
Kitchen and Phillips drove an ANR truck 
out of Los Angeles, California, heading for 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 5, 1986. 
They stopped at the port of entry east of 
Wendover, Utah, early in the morning on 
February 6th. At the weigh station, a 
Utah Highway Patrolman warned Kitchen 
and Phillips of black ice on Interstate 
Eighty beginning twelve to fourteen miles 
ahead, and continuing into Salt Lake City. 
As the truckers left the port of entry, 
Kitchen drove the ANR truck while Phillips 
climbed into the "sleeper" part of the 
truck's cab to rest. A Cal Gas truck 
passed them five minutes after the ANR 
truck left the port of entry. At the time, 
Kitchen was driving the ANR truck ap-
proximately twenty to twenty-five miles an 
hour on the wet, but not icy, interstate 
highway. Kitchen testified the Cal Gas 
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truck passed "in a hurry," but he did not 
attempt to estimate the Cal Gas truck's 
speed. 
Kitchen first encountered black ice ap-
proximately fifteen miles later. Kitchen 
proceeded slowly, continuing to drive ap-
proximately twenty to twenty-five miles an 
hour on the icy road, A Toyota pickup 
truck passed the ANR truck in the left lane 
of the two eastbound lanes of traffic four 
miles after Kitchen first encountered black 
ice and approximately forty-five minutes 
after being passed by the Cal Gas truck. 
The Toyota turned on its high-beam head-
lights as it passed Kitchen. According to 
Kitchen, the Toyota's headlights illuminat-
ed a "shadow" lying across the road ap-
proximately a quarter mile ahead. When 
Kitchen saw the "shadow" ahead, he took 
his foot off the throttle, causing the ANR 
truck to slow. Almost immediately, the 
ANR truck was struck from behind by 
another large truck owned by C.R. England 
& Sons, Inc. The ANR truck overturned 
on its side, and both Kitchen and Phillips 
were injured. After Kitchen and Phillips 
were pulled from the ANR truck, they rec-
ognized the "shadow" as the Cal Gas truck 
that passed them earlier. The Cal Gas 
truck was overturned approximately 200 
feet ahead of the ANR truck and was 
blocking the left lane and part of the right 
lane of the eastbound traffic. 
Kitchen and Phillips subsequently 
brought this action against both C.R. Eng-
land and Cal Gas, alleging that their truck 
drivers' negligence caused Kitchen's and 
Phillips's injuries. Prior to trial, Kitchen 
and Phillips reached a settlement with C.R. 
England. Thereafter, Cal Gas filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment claiming that, 
even if the Cal Gas driver had operated the 
Cal Gas truck negligently, such negligence 
could not have been the proximate cause of 
Kitchen's and Phillips's injuries. The trial 
court denied this motion. Cal Gas subse-
quently filed a motion for summary judg-
ment claiming there was no evidence that 
the Cal Gas driver was negligent. The 
trial court granted Cal Gas summary judg-
ment, concluding, as a matter of law, that 
on the undisputed facts before the court, 
Cal Gas was not negligent. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal, Kitchen and Phillips assert 
the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the issue of Cal Gas's negli-
gence. Summary judgment is proper when 
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56 (1991). We review a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment under 
a "correctness" standard. Daniels v. Des-
eret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 771 P.2d 
1100, 1101-02 (Utah App.), cert denied, 
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). We accord no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion 
that the facts are not in dispute nor the 
court's legal conclusions based on those 
facts. See Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 
P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App.1989), cert, de-
nied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). When de-
termining if summary judgment is proper, 
we view all relevant facts, including all 
inferences arising from the facts, in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion. See Barlow Soc v. Commer-
cial Sec Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 
1986). 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON NEGLIGENCE 
In this case, Kitchen and Phillips argue 
summary judgment was improper because 
there are disputed issues of fact as to 
whether the Cal Gas driver's negligence 
caused their truck to overturn and block 
traffic. The Cal Gas driver died shortly 
after the accident of causes unrelated to 
the accident. Kitchen and Phillips offer no 
direct evidence as to what caused the Cal 
Gas truck to overturn because of the driv-
er's death and the lack of other witnesses. 
However, they assert a jury could infer the 
Cal Gas driver was negligent in driving at 
an excessive speed given the road condi-
tions. Kitchen and Phillips claim this infer-
ence reasonably flows from Kitchen's testi-
mony that the Cal Gas truck passed them 
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"in a hurry" some forty-five minutes be-
fore the accident] and also from the undis-
puted facts concerning the poor road condi-
tions existing on the morning of the acci-
dent. 
Conversely, Cal Gas argues summary 
judgment was proper because there is no 
fact, or any reasonable inference drawn 
from the facts, that establish the Cal Gas 
driver was negligent. Cal Gas contends 
the mere fact that the Cal Gas truck passed 
the ANR truck forty-five minutes prior to 
the accident cannot support any inferences 
about the Cal Gas driver's conduct just 
prior to the accident, particularly given the 
substantially different road conditions ex-
isting where the accident occurred. Addi-
tionally, Cal Gas points out that Kitchen 
and Phillips have offered no expert testimo-
ny as to the cause of the Cal Gas truck 
overturning. The trial judge agreed with 
Cal Gas, concluding: "on the undisputed 
facts viewed most favorably to the plain-
tiffs, no facts establish the Cal Gas driver 
was negligent; therefore, any such finding 
by a jury could only be based on specula-
tion." 
[1-3] In a negligence action, the plain-
tiff has the burden of establishing four 
elements: "that the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty; that defendant breached 
the duty (negligence); that the breach of 
the duty was the proximate cause of plain-
tiffs injury; and that there was in fact 
injury." Steffensen v. Smith's Manage-
ment Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 485 (Utah App. 
1. At oral argument, counsel for Cal Gas indi-
cated that at the same time the trial judge grant-
ed Cal Gas's motion for summan judgment, the 
judge also granted Cal Gas's motion in limine to 
exclude Kitchen's testimonx as to the Cal Gas 
truck's speed when the Cal Gas truck passed 
Kitchen In bringing this to our attention, 
counsel for Cal Gas seems to suggest the trial 
judge did not take this evidence into considera-
tion in ruling on Cal Gas's motion for summary 
judgment, and likewise implies that we should 
not consider this evidence. 
Our independent review of the trial judge's 
rulings suggests that the order in limine exclud-
ed the disputed portions of Kitchen's testimony 
from trial, not from the consideration of the 
matter for purposes of the summary judgment 
ruling. There is no indication that the trial 
judge did not consider this eudence when rul-
ing on Cal Gas's motion for summary judgment. 
1991). The issue of negligence, or breach 
of a legal duty, is normally a question of 
fact for the jury. See Harris v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 
1983). Accordingly, summary judgment is 
generally improper on the issue of negli-
gence and only in clear-cut cases, with the 
exercise of great caution, should a court 
take the issue of negligence from the prov-
ince of the jury. See Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982). However, a party may not merely 
rely on bald assertions of negligence to 
overcome a motion for summary judgment. 
"Naked assertions of negligence, unsup-
ported by any facts whatsoever . . . [fall] 
far short of raising a material issue of fact 
on the issue of negligence/' Massey v. 
Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938-39 
(Utah 1980).2 To have a negligence case 
submitted to the jury, "[a] plaintiff must 
submit sufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case against the defendant." 
Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 
419, 497 P.2d 28, 30 (1972). 
Initially, we recognize the Cal Gas driver 
(and, through vicarious liability, Cal Gas) 
owed Kitchen and Phillips a duty to act as 
a reasonable and prudent truck driver 
would have acted under the circumstances. 
See Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 
P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981). We must decide 
whether there is sufficient evidence of the 
Cal Gas driver's breach of this duty to 
On appeal, notwithstanding the order in limine, 
we consider Kitchen's testimony regarding the 
Cal Gas truck's speed in our review of the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment. 
2. See, e.g, Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 
P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah J973) (summary judg 
ment for defendant proper where pleadings and 
depositions showed no negligence or omission 
of dut> of reasonable care), Dybowskt v Ernest 
W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446-47 (Utah App 
1989) (summar) judgment for defendant proper 
in slip and fall case where customer could not 
offer any evidence that defendant mall owner 
had acted negligentl)); Robinson v. lntermoun-
tain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah 
App. 1987) (summary judgment proper on issue 
of negligence where plaintiff has failed to se 
cure expert testimony in medical malpractice 
action). 
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raise an issue of material fact, thereby 
requiring us to overturn the trial court's 
summary judgment on the issue of negli-
gence. 
14] Utah courts have long held that 
"[t]he mere happening of [an] accident of 
course does not prove that the defendants 
were negligent.*' Horsley v. Robinson, 
112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596 (1947). 
Rather, a plaintiff must offer some proof 
of negligence to prevail at trial. See Mas-
sey, 609 P.2d at 938-39. Utah courts have 
articulated this burden of proof principle as 
a rebuttable presumption: Where a driver 
is unavailable to testify as to his or her 
actions and where there is no other evi-
dence of the driver's actions, the driver is 
presumed to have been exercising due care. 
DeMille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 
P.2d 159, 161 (1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 
1079, 90 S.Ct. 1531, 25 L.Ed.2d 814 (1970). 
DeMille was a wrongful death action 
arising from a head-on automobile collision 
in which there were no survivors and no 
eyewitnesses. Id. 462 P.2d at 160. The 
only relevant evidence was that the dece-
dent, on whose behalf plaintiff was suing, 
had been driving several feet over the cen-
ter line in the road when the accident oc-
curred. At the close of evidence, both par-
ties moved for a directed verdict. The 
court ruled the decedent was negligent as a 
matter of law for driving on the wrong side 
of the road in the path of an approaching 
automobile. However, the court denied 
both directed verdict motions and sub-
mitted the issue of the other driver's negli-
gence to the jury, which returned a verdict 
for the plaintiff-decedent. Id. 462 P.2d at 
161. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed, holding the lower court should 
not have submitted the issue of negligence 
to the jury. The DeMille court pointed out 
that the plaintiff-decedent had submitted 
no evidence of the other automobile driv-
er's conduct. The court explained that, 
because of the instinct for self preserva-
tion, the law presumes an automobile driv-
3. The presumption outlined in DeMille was es-
tablished in earlier Utah cases See Mecham v 
Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P.2d 285, 290 (1953), 
Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot, 120 Utah 
453, 235 P.2d 515, 517 (1951). The DeMille 
er is exercising due care and that the pre-
sumption disappears only when the oppos-
ing party produces evidence of negligence. 
Id. Because the plaintiff-decedent had pro-
duced no evidence as to the other driver's 
conduct, the presumption remained intact 
and thus the trial court erred in not grant-
ing a directed verdict in favor of the defen-
dant driver.3 Id. 462 P.2d at 162. 
The DeMille presumption, which disap-
pears when a prima facie case of negli-
gence is presented, Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 
P.2d 489, 495 (Utah 1985), is really no more 
than an incorporation of the evidentiary 
burden of proof in a negligence action. 
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof and 
must establish a prima facie case to survive 
summary disposal of the case. Lindsay, 
497 P.2d at 30; Dybowski v. Ernest W. 
Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah App. 
1989). 
[5] In light of this authority, we must 
now determine if Kitchen and Phillips of-
fered any evidence of negligence to rebut 
the presumption that Cal Gas's driver was 
exercising due care at the time the truck 
overturned. In this case, Kitchen and Phil-
lips produced no evidence as to the Cal Gas 
driver's negligence, and therefore, they 
cannot survive a motion for summary judg-
ment. The Cal Gas driver's being "in a 
hurry" forty-five minutes prior to the acci-
dent cannot sustain an inference that the 
Cal Gas driver was speeding and that such 
speeding continued after the roads became 
icy. Further, we cannot say the mere fact 
that the Cal Gas truck was overturned in 
the road establishes that the Cal Gas driver 
acted negligently. There are numerous 
possible explanations as to why the truck 
overturned, many of which would not in-
volve the negligence of the driver and, in 
this case, all of which require speculation. 
Submitting the issue of negligence to the 
jury would require the jury to engage in 
mere speculation as to whether the Cal Gas 
driver was negligent. Accordingly, be-
presumption uas recently reaffirmed in Pearce 
v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah 1985) (pre-
sumption of due care rebutted where evidence 
indicated deceased acted negligently). 
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cause Kitchen and Phillips have not produc-
ed any evidentiary basis for a jury to find 
the Cal Gas driver acted negligently, the 
trial court's summary judgment for Cal 
Gas on the issue of negligence was proper.4 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
Alternatively, Kitchen and Phillips assert 
the trial court erred in rejecting their argu-
ment that the Cal Gas driver's negligence 
can be inferred under the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. 
[6,7] Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evi-
dence which allows a party, in certain cir-
cumstances, to raise an inference that an-
other party has acted negligently notwith-
standing a lack of evidence concerning the 
other party's actions. 
[T]he purpose of res ipsa loquitur is "to 
permit one who suffers injury from 
something under the control of another, 
which ordinarily would not cause injury 
except for the other's negligence, to 
present his grievance to a court or jury 
on the basis that an inference of negli-
4. Kitchen and Phillips contend the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals decision in Kelly v. Montoya, 
81 N.M. 591, 470 P.2d 563 (Ct.App.1970) should 
persuade us to remand their case for a jury trial. 
In Montoya, a truck passenger was injured 
when the truck collided with defendants' ve-
hicles. Defendants had stopped their vehicles 
in the center of the road at the scene of a prior 
collision that occurred during a sandstorm. Id. 
470 P.2d at 564. The New Mexico court re-
versed the summary judgment for defendants, 
holding that material issues of fact existed as to 
whether defendants violated a safety statute pro-
hibiting the leaving of vehicles on the highway. 
The facts of Montoya, however, are distin-
guishable from the facts surrounding the acci-
dent in which Kitchen and Phillips were in-
jured. In Montoya, there was clear evidence 
that the defendants violated a safety statute. 
The nature of defendants' conduct in Montoya 
was not in dispute: they had parked their cars 
on the road during the day. In our case, how-
ever, there is no evidence that the Cal Gas 
driver's negligence caused the truck to overturn 
and block the road. Thus, Montoya is not appli-
cable here. 
Likewise, Kitchen and Phillips argue that the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Horsley v. 
Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (Utah 
1947), mandates reversal. Again we find this 
case distinguishable on its facts. In Horsley, a 
bus passenger sued for injuries sustained in an 
accident between a car and the bus. Because of 
snowy and hazardous road conditions, the car 
driver lost control of the car and crossed the 
.gence may reasonably be drawn from 
such facts; and cast the burden upon the 
other to make proof of what happened." 
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 
833 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lund v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 
952, 954 (I960)). Accordingly, the fact that 
Kitchen and Phillips failed to produce any 
evidence of negligence does not, by itself, 
preclude their res ipsa loquitur claim. 
However, before a party is entitled to pro-
ceed on a res ipsa loquitur theory, the 
party must satisfy a preliminary evidentia-
ry foundation demonstrating that the facts 
of the case properly present a res ipsa 
loquitur question. See Nixdorf v. Hicken, 
612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). This foun-
dation consists of three parts: 
(1) . . . [T]he accident was of a kind 
which in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had the defen-
dants) used due care, (2) the instrument 
or thing causing the injury was at the 
time of the accident under the manage-
ment and control of the defendant, and 
center line of a highway. The bus was coming 
from the other direction and was unable to 
avoid the car. The plaintiff was injured when 
the force of the accident threw her head for-
ward and she struck her neck on the seat in 
front of her. Id 186 P.2d at 592-93. A jury 
returned a verdict for plaintiff passenger and 
the bus company appealed. In affirming, the 
Utah Supreme Court held there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to infer the bus was driv-
ing at an excessive speed for the given road 
conditions. Id. 186 P.2d at 599. There, the 
plaintiff testified that when the accident oc-
curred, the bus was traveling fifty miles per 
hour, and that when the car crossed the center 
line, the bus was a city block away. The Hors-
ley court recognized that a jury could have rea-
sonably found the bus driver did not have his 
vehicle under sufficient control for the condi-
tions and, therefore, the court affirmed the jury 
award. Id 186 P.2d at 600. 
Unlike this case, the Horsley court was able to 
consider substantial evidence of the bus driver's 
conduct; therefore, the "inference" did not arise 
from the "mere happening" of an accident. The 
Horsley court was faced with a substantial con-
tradiction in testimony, not with the complete 
lack of testimony as to the bus driver's conduct, 
as is the case here with regard to the Cal Gas 
driver's conduct. Accordingly, Kitchen and 
Phillips cannot rely on Horsley to raise an infer-
ence that the Cal Gas driver acted negligently. 
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(3) the accident happened irrespective of 
any participation at the time by the plain-
tiff. 
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 
297 P.2d 221, 224 (1956)). Once a party 
makes this showing, there arises a "rebut-
table inference of negligence which will 
carry the [party's] case past the motion for 
nonsuit." Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354. 
Therefore, to determine if Kitchen and 
Phillips were entitled to proceed under a 
res ipsa loquitur theory, we must evaluate 
the evidence in light of the above three-part 
test. 
[8] Under the first prong of the test, 
we must determine whether the accident in 
question was the kind which ordinarily 
does not occur in the absence of negli-
gence. Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196. Kitchen 
and Phillips argue that, normally, a truck 
does not roll over in the absence of negli-
gence. Cal Gas, on the other hand, asserts 
that because there is no evidence from 
which to infer negligence, and because of 
the icy road conditions, it is not more likely 
than not that the Cal Gas truck overturned 
due to its driver's negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently 
outlined the analytical framework for de-
ciding the first prong of the res ipsa loqui-
tur test: 
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury 
instruction on res ipsa loquitur, the 
plaintiff must have presented evidence 
that the occurrence of the incident is 
"more probably than not caused by negli-
gence." The plaintiff need not eliminate 
all possible inferences of non-negligence, 
but the balance of probabilities must 
weigh in favor of negligence, or res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply. 
Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 
1985) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Further, the court recognized that "[w]hen, 
however, the probabilities of a situation are 
outside the realm of common knowledge, 
expert evidence may be used to establish 
the necessary foundational probabilities." 
Id. 
Courts from several jurisdictions have 
held that the mere fact that a driver has 
lost control of a vehicle on icy roads is 
insufficient to meet the first prong of the 
res ipsa loquitur test. See, e.g., Millonig v. 
Bakken, 112 Wis.2d 445, 334 N.W.2d 80, 
86-87 (1983) (rear-end collision resulting 
from icy roads does not raise inference of 
negligence under res ipsa loquitur as skid-
ding on ice can occur without fault of driv-
er); Wilson v. Rushton, 199 Kan. 659, 433 
P.2d 444, 449 (1967) (automobile passenger 
could not sustain burden under first prong 
of res ipsa loquitur test in injury action 
arising from accident in which driver 
passed another automobile just as the road 
had suddenly changed to ice); see also 4 
Fowler V. Harper, Flemming James, Jr. & 
Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 19.7 at 
57 (2d ed. 1986) (mere fact of vehicle sliding 
on icy road insufficient to raise inference of 
negligence under first prong of res ipsa 
loquitur test). 
We agree with this authority as we can-
not say that when a driver loses control of 
a vehicle on icy roads, the driver, more 
likely than not, was negligent. Common 
experience and reason suggest black ice is 
a hazard that threatens even the most rea-
sonable and prudent driver. Accordingly, 
we find that Kitchen and Phillips have not 
met their burden under the first prong of 
the res ipsa loquitur test. 
Because Kitchen and Phillips have failed 
to show that the accident was, more likely 
than not, the result of the Cal Gas driver's 
negligence, thus failing to meet the first 
prong of the res ipsa loquitur test, it is 
unnecessary for us to consider the other 
two prongs of the test. Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court's ruling rejecting 
Kitchen's and Phillips's res ipsa loquitur 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment dismissing Kitchen's 
and Phillips's claim. Kitchen and Phillips 
produced no evidence that the Cal Gas driv-
er was negligent. Furthermore, they can-
not rely on the evidentiary doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur to escape summary judgment 
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as the accident is not the type which nor- eral appearance," which gave trial court 
mally does not occur in the absence of personal jurisdiction over him. 
negligence. See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ, concur. 
fo |«VNUHBlRSYSTtM> 
David C. BARLOW and Clare O. Barlow, 
d/b/a Barlow's Wood Classics, Plain-
tiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Alan J. CAPPO, d/b/a Western Building 
Center, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 910417-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 21, 1991. 
Civil action was commenced. After en-
tering default judgment, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Utah County, Ray M. Harding, 
J., denied defendant's motion to quash any 
return of service, and defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that 
defendant's motion to dismiss on ground of 
forum non conveniens was general appear-
ance, which gave lower court personal jur-
isdiction over him. 
Affirmed. 
Appearance <3»9(5), 19(1) 
Defendant's motion to dismiss on 
ground of forum non conveniens was "gen-
1. Rule 4(f)(2) of the 1989 version of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provided. 
In circumstances . . . justifying service of 
summons by publication, if the party desiring 
service of summons shall file a verified peti-
tion stating the facts from which the court 
determines thai service by mail is just as 
likely to give actual notice as service by publi-
cation, the court may order that service of 
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
Clair J. Jaussi, Provo, for plaintiffs and 
appellees. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GARFF, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Alan J. Cappo, d/b/a Western Building 
Center, appeals from an order denying his 
motion to quash service of summons and 
set aside judgment. 
FACTS 
Appellees David C. Barlow and Clare 0. 
Barlow, d/b/a Barlow's Wood Classics 
(Barlows), mailed to appellant Alan J. Cap-
po (Cappo) a complaint, motion and order 
for alternative service by mail. The com-
plaint was filed on June 8, 1989. The mo-
tion for alternative service by mail, along 
with the affidavit, was filed June 6, 1989 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
4(f)(2) (1989).1 
On August 3, 1987, Cappo filed a motion 
to dismiss Barlows' action on the ground 
that the forum was not convenient. Cappo 
characterized this motion as a special ap-
pearance. He requested that the action be 
dismissed and then be filed in Colorado, 
arguing that various warranty claims exist-
ed upon Barlows' products sold in Colora-
do, that all of the witnesses required to 
prove said claims were in Colorado, that 
much of the evidence was in Colorado, and 
summons shall be given by the clerk mailing 
a copy of the summons and complaint to the 
party to be served at his address, or his last 
known address. Service shall be complete ten 
days after such mailing. 
This Rule has since been changed and its corre-
sponding version can be found in Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 4(g) (1991). 
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of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Cal Gas Corporation 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH KITCHEN and 
RICHARD PHILLIPS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
C. R. ENGLAND & SONS, INC., a ] 
Utah corporation, and CAL GAS ] 
COMPANY, INC., a California ] 
corporation, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 ORDER IN LIMINE 
> AND 
> SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C87-02515 
) Judge Frank G. Noel 
The Court having reviewed defendant Cal Gas1 motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of speed and Cal Gas* motion for 
summary judgment; having considered the memoranda of defendant 
Cal Gas and plaintiffs Kitchen and Phillips; having heard 
arguments of counsel as to Cal Gas' motion for summary 
judgment; and having granted plaintiffs* motion to publish all 
discovery and having considered same; 
The Court finds on the undisputed material facts 
viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, no facts establish the 
Cal Gas driver was negligent, therefore any such finding by a 
jury could only be based on speculation. 
fadvM"'*'? 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,_ ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1, Defendant Cal Gas' Motion in Limine is granted; 
2. Defendant Cal Gas' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted and plaintiffs' claims against Cal Gas are dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits• 
The Court further finds pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no 
just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs entry of 
judgment for defendant Cal Gas on plaintiffs* claims. 
DATED this day of January, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
!S R. BLACK< 
& ^ 
JOHN|M. CHIPMAN, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
C.__R. England & Sons 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
JAME '/^ESg. 
/orney for Plaintiff 
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